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Abstract 
This essay argues that the ‘materiality’ of life and law are today technological artefacts of a biopolitical 
project, and that sexual-reproductive and legislative boundaries are the boundaries around which power 
coheres and materializes—making life law’s matter, an effect that is slyly taken up as legal ‘cause’. I offer 
as case studies readings of two incommensurable texts: Milan Kundera’s political fiction, The Joke, and 
the contemporary fertility industry, an instantiation of biopolitical techno-science. Bringing into tension 
the ‘materiality’ of life and law across these two sites, I hope to surface some of the vernaculars of 
(bio)political power—rhetorical matters of historical, political, socioeconomic, and technological concern 
that nevertheless claim the objectivity of ‘matter’. Both texts also concern reproduction—sexual, artificial, 
cultural, political—and how it is used to promote a certain ideology of citizenship and to regulate political 
‘freedoms’. While Kundera’s novel, written in the 1960s, represents a critique of ‘old’ materialism as the 
reproduction of Communist State power, here, in juxtaposition, Kundera’s fiction occasions my critique of 
(legal) ‘new’ materialism—as neoliberal and biopolitical investment in the speculative futures proffered by 
the fertility industry. 
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1 Introduction
If this essay were to address a legal or juridical object, that object would 
be life itself. And if I concerned myself with law’s power over life, in a 
particular time or place, according to a specific piece of legislation or 
judgment, I would certainly fail to address life—as matter, as object, or 
otherwise—and how life matters for us. Life is not just what we are—
as living beings—or what we hold in common with other living things; 
life holds moral value for us, it conditions—and it is the condition 
of—law or any legal materialization, any materiality. This contribution 
does not take a legal or juridical ‘object’, but rather enquires into the 
rhetorical and mediatized conditions of possibility for ‘life’ to appear as 
a legal ‘matter’—a matter that wears the mantle of a certain objectivity. 
And it does. I write in the context of a spate of harrowing U.S. legislation 
enacted to restrict women’s reproductive rights, frequently voiced in 
the name of life. How such life matters—and whose lives matter—is 
here as elsewhere perhaps as much about religious belief and political 
ideology as it is about biology, citizenship, women’s rights, men’s rights, 
the rights of the unborn, and so on. Indeed, ‘life’ is at once the most 
molecular of phenomena and the most angelic; but law, too, has many 
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faces, many points of application and production. In what follows, I 
take ‘law’ and ‘life’ as capacious terms in correspondence—part of the 
wider rhetorical and media-ecological context for the (re)production 
of human subjectivity. To invoke several lines from Derrida (1991), 
this wider context should be understood as ‘everything that links the 
“subject” to conscience, to humanity, to history … and above all to 
the law, as subject subjected to the law, subject to the law in its very 
autonomy, to ethical or juridical law, to political law or power, to order 
(symbolic or not)…’ (99). To these many faces of law we must add the 
biopolitical technologies that (re)mediate each of these intersecting 
and ramified fields of subjectivation. 
Lives—whether factual or fictional—are undoubtedly conscripted 
by law, sites of law’s many applications and productions; and yet ‘life’ 
also conscripts law in significant ways. Whatever the term signifies and 
however it matters for us, ‘life’ mutates historically, politically, according 
to fashion, and circulates memetically in and across our media networks. 
Law is subject to this fluidity, I contend. Far from a sovereign power 
whose prerogative is to ‘take life or let live’, increasingly law and life 
are technological artefacts of biopolitical power—a power that ‘makes 
live and lets die’ (Foucault 2003). This paper offers readings of two 
‘case studies’ or, rather, ‘sites’—one factual, one fictional—and brings 
them into correspondence. In doing so, I hope to surface some of the 
vernaculars of biopolitical power, across law and life—rhetorical matters 
of historical, political, socioeconomic, and technological concern that 
nevertheless claim the objectivity or materiality of ‘fact’. Both sites 
index the circulation and (re)production of power, one focusing on the 
fertility industry as an instantiation of biopolitical techno-science, the 
other through a piece of political fiction written by Milan Kundera in 
the mid-1960s. Drawing on the work of Derrida (1987), I read both 
sites through the conceit of the ‘postcard’—a trope whose transmission 
is neither quite public nor private, subject to fictionalizations as well 
as factual repercussions. While Kundera’s novel, The Joke, has little 
to do with the fertility industry as we know it, it nonetheless speaks 
to political production and reproduction, blurring the public and the 
private, and enlisting them as regulative matters of moral law, political 
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law, power, and social order (symbolic or not). The fictional genre has 
the added benefit of providing us some critical distance—temporally, 
politically, geographically—from which we might ref lect on the 
political powers, and ruses, of our contemporary moment. But more 
than this: Kundera’s novel stages a critique of the political atrocities of 
an ‘old’ materialism, in its Communist zeal to abolish private property. 
This resonates uncannily, I suggest, with neoliberal ‘new’ materialism 
and its ideological ‘privatization’ of life, as we see in the fertility 
industry. This essay is situated in the dissonant spaces between these 
two political ideologies, legal regimes, and instantiations of ‘life itself ’.
My claim throughout is that the ‘materiality’ of law and life are 
today technological artefacts of a biopolitical project, and that sexual-
reproductive and legislative boundaries are the boundaries around 
which power coheres and materializes—making life law’s matter, an 
effect that is slyly taken up as legal cause. I am interested in biopolitical 
technologies and the regulation of ‘life’ for a number of intersecting 
reasons, which are fleshed out in the tensions and juxtapositions of 
my two ‘sites’. Both ‘sites’ concern reproduction—sexual, artificial, 
cultural, political—and how it is used to promote a certain ideology of 
citizenship and to regulate political ‘freedoms’. Power in this guise is 
less about a coherent raison d’état in the model of top-down governance 
or will-to-power, signalling instead diffuse technologies d’état that are 
today overwhelmingly privatized, highly mediatized, and driven by 
neoliberal ideology. My deepest concern is that the ‘materialities’ of 
law and life are defined in advance through (bio)political and techno-
scientific rhetorics—defined in advance, or better, as an advance on 
(and investment in) the ‘hopeful’ futures that are meant to seem within 
our wilful grasp today.
This essay first introduces the trope of the ‘postcard’ (Derrida 
1987) as a (re)productive figure in generative transmission. Alongside 
Derrida’s ‘postcard’ it then reads the postcard that is pivotal to the 
plot of Kundera’s political novel. It then turns to select ‘postcards’ 
from the fertility industry to advance a critical political argument 
about the manipulation of hope in the speculative futures of neoliberal 
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techno-science. Drawing on my correspondent readings of both ‘sites’, 
the following section addresses the rhetorical matter of law and life, 
arguing that new (legal) materialisms falter in at least two related ways: 
temporally and rhetorically. That is, the concept of (legal) materiality 
cannot quite account for speculative futurity or for the generative 
agency of its own language, which, I contend, rhetorically constitutes 
legal materiality without itself being a legal ‘matter’. The final section 
returns in refrain to my juxtaposed sites to offer a close reading of two 
juxtaposing scenes from Kundera’s novel. I argue for the significance 
of these juxtapositions for the biopolitical understanding of fertility 
in today’s neoliberal milieu. My argumentative style in this essay is 
to write through fiction, rather than in a strictly propositional form: 
this is a performative gesture that refuses to close up the space—the 
‘void’—between my two ‘sites’ and to permit their ethical collision.
2 Postcards
Throughout The Post Card, Derrida admits his obsession with a certain 
postcard that served both as occasion and writing ‘material’ for his own 
postcards from Oxford to Paris in 1977–78, and for his own reading 
and ‘raving’, as he puts it—la délire, or the ‘unreading’—of its scene, 
which he confesses he finds ‘obscene’ (see Figure 1).  The image depicts 
Plato standing closely behind Socrates, who is seated at a scrivener’s 
table. The placement of the philosophers inverts the conventional and 
longstanding relation between master and disciple: we have been taught 
that Socrates spoke whereas Plato later fictionalized Socrates’s speech, 
his life and death, in writing. No surprise that Derrida was delighted 
to find such an artefact. His comments on this postcard—written on 
countless copies of them—are worth glossing in this context: ‘I tell you’, 
Derrida writes, ‘that I see Plato getting an erection in Socrates’ back and 
see the insane hubris of his prick, an interminable, disproportionate 
erection … sliding, still warm, under Socrates’ right leg’ (1987: 18). The 
insane hubris involves the ‘emission of sense or of seed’, Plato’s power 
over Socrates through his writings (themselves ‘postcards’ of sorts), and 
the power of the written word across our media ecologies of production 
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and reproduction. ‘Imagine the day’, Derrida continues, 
that we will be able to send sperm by post card, without going through 
a check drawn on some sperm bank, and that it remains living enough 
for the artificial insemination to yield fecundation, and even desire. 
(1987: 24)
Figure 1: Plato and Socrates, the frontispiece of Prognostica Socratis 
basilei (13th c.), by Matthew Paris
We are meant to imagine that this day has arrived, and as I 
argue below, the fertility industry materializes Derrida’s metaphor. 
The postcard itself is a curious reproduction of a frontispiece from 
a thirteenth-century fortune-telling book—an early technology of 
speculative futures. Writing from one such future, and reflecting 
on this image, Derrida suggests that the postcard—in its specificity, 
but also as metaphor—inverts the generational transmission that we 
have always held as true. The ‘charter’ or the ‘contract’, ‘which quite 
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stupidly one has to believe’, writes Derrida, runs as follows: ‘Socrates 
comes before Plato, there is between them—and in general—an order 
of generations, an irreversible sequence of inheritance’ (1987: 20). And 
yet this ‘irreversible’ sequence, the temporality of generation, is as it 
were inverted by the technologies of (re)production, old and new. The 
alternations take their turns. And yet this intermediation is difficult 
to grasp, as N. Katherine Hayles (2005) writes:
The contemporary indoctrination into linear causality is so strong 
that it continues to exercise a fatal attraction for much contemporary 
thought. It must be continually resisted if we are fully to realize the 
implications of multicausal and multilayered hierarchical systems, 
which entail distributed agency, emergent processes, unpredictable 
coevolutions, and seemingly paradoxical interactions between 
convergent and divergent processes. (31)
A temporal destabilization of generational relations, of genetic code 
and moral code, would be dismissed by staunch materialists as a joke. 
But any joke is in the timing and the telling—in its transmission, its 
reception, and (especially) everything in-between.
Derrida’s postcard imposed itself on me as I read Milan Kundera’s 
1967 novel, The Joke (1992), in which the plot hinges on the reception 
(or interception) of a postcard intended as a joke. In the 1960s, this book 
had for two years been kept from publication in Prague by Communist 
censorship, not for its inclusion of a fictional postcard, but for the 
political message it implied despite its status as a work of fiction or a 
‘ joke’. On my reading, and in my use of Kundera’s fiction here, The Joke 
helps us to read our contemporary political moment, and to take some 
critical distance from it. The novel’s fervent young protagonist, Ludvik, 
a student leader in the Communist Party, finds himself, to his horror, 
‘excommunicated’ from the Party, expelled from university, socially 
ostracized, and imprisoned for many years in a labour camp for writing 
a postcard—a joke—to his would-be girlfriend, Marketa. Marketa was 
away at a two-week Party training course, a summer retreat intended to 
indoctrinate students in the tactics of the revolutionary movement. Her 
political zeal ostensibly fortified, she wrote to Ludvik full of gushing 
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enthusiasm for the programme, praising the early-morning calisthenics, 
the talks, and the ‘healthy atmosphere’. This may have been a coded 
script. But Ludvik, infatuated and naïve and sexually frustrated (a self-
confessed ‘skirt-chaser’), was overcome with jealousy and sullen that 
she was not with him. ‘I quite agreed with what she said’, he narrates,
I too believed in the imminence of a revolution in Western Europe; 
there was only one thing I could not accept: that she should be so 
happy when I was missing her so much. So I bought a postcard and 
(to hurt, shock, and confuse her) wrote: ‘Optimism is the opium of the 
people! A healthy atmosphere stinks of stupidity! Long live Trotsky! 
Ludvik’. (1992: 34)1
Is this message a matter of libidinal cathexis, insane hubris, phallic 
emission, or something else? Joke or no joke, its delivery misfires, and 
its misdelivery is incendiary.
Ludvik’s postcard is intercepted and scrutinized. What follows 
might be described in today’s terms as a right-wing troll storm, using 
a Party platform and mobilizing media connections. Shunned and 
demonized by his former comrades, Ludvik finds himself interrogated 
by the District Party Secretariat, and eventually defending himself in 
what proves to be a kangaroo court. They recite to him his postcard to 
Marketa, to which he replies, ‘Comrades, it was meant to be funny’. 
‘Do you consider it funny? one of the Comrades asked the other two. 
Both shook their heads’. Ludvik protests, ‘it was just a few sentences, 
a joke, I didn’t give it a second thought. If I’d meant anything bad by 
it, I wouldn’t have sent it to a Party training course!’ ‘How you wrote 
it is immaterial’, his Comrades respond. ‘Whether you wrote it quickly 
or slowly, in your lap or at a desk, you could only have written what 
was inside you. That and nothing else’ (37–38).
Kundera’s lines above strike me as profoundly contemporary: the 
truth of fiction in direct correspondence with the fiction of our truth. 
We might parse these lines in the language of identity politics, where 
one’s identity authorizes in advance—and demands—a certain speech 
and action, and conversely, where one’s speech/acts are always already 
inexorably tied to one’s identity, and subject either to privilege or a 
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police-function, approbation or admonition. Lauren Berlant (1999) 
describes identity politics as a ‘feeling politics’, a direct correspondence 
between affect and truth: ‘the notion that the feeling self is the true 
self, the self that must be protected from pain or from history, that 
scene of unwelcome changing’ (56). The postcard is material evidence 
of desires ‘inside you’ that cannot be disavowed—that and nothing 
else. Nobody ‘gets’ the joke because it is on them: pious obedience to 
the Party line can be no laughing matter, or, in more contemporary 
terms, one’s identity can be no joke, an emission of sense or of seed: it 
must be reproduced, disseminated, in the vulgar credos of the day. In 
the postcard, on it, the public and the private enter into confusion and, 
ultimately, fusion. Ludvik says, ‘I came to realize that there was no 
power capable of changing the image of my person lodged somewhere 
in the supreme court of human destinies; that this image (even though 
it bore no resemblance to me) was much more real than my actual self; 
that I was its shadow and not it mine’ (50). This is a socialist aphorism 
and an identity politics. Another of Kundera’s characters describes a 
more ardent Communist comrade: ‘he never tired of repeating that 
the new man differed from the old insofar as he had abolished the 
distinction between public and private life’ (17). As I suggest in the 
next section, this distinction has been abolished for us by virtue of 
biopolitical technologies, (social) media, and a neoliberal ethic.
3 (Re)producing hope
Consider for a moment what I shall call digital ‘postcards’ from 
representatives of the fertility industry—several random screenshots 
gathered from websites discovered through simple Google searches. 
Figures 2 and 3 hail from India: take note of the complexion of hope 
and happiness that each purveys. As Valerie Hartouni (1997) has noted, 
fertility and motherhood are predominantly represented as white (45), 
though increasingly this is a matter of reproductive tourism, appealing 
to a clientele themselves imagined to be western and white. 
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Figure 2: Screenshot from www.ivfgenetics.in
Figure 3: Screenshot from www.fertility-clinic.in.
Figure 4: Screenshot from www.christcenteredmama.com.
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Hope and/as life are inscribed in the Christian-evangelical fertility 
narrative as well, with messaging resembling a postcard or partisan 
placard (see Figure 4). The examples are legion and could be multiplied. 
It is from within this media ecology, I argue, that we must read the 
fertility industry, its hopes and potential harms. For the techno-
scientific aspirations of fertility do not stand in isolation from the 
innumerable mediatizations of race and face, of desirable futures, 
of citizenship, of law and liberal human rights discourse, or of the 
myriad value scripts that shore up and normalize a certain neoliberal 
biopolitics, an ontology by which some will be ‘made’ to live, brought 
to life and light, while others will be left to perish on the dark margins 
of technological ‘progress’.
Herein lies the differential and discriminatory power ‘to make 
live and let die’, Michel Foucault’s (2003) well-known definition for 
biopolitics. All lives do not matter, it would seem, or their matter and 
mattering do not obey the same scripts: some will be made to live, 
others left to die. As Kafka once quipped, ‘There is plenty of hope—
only not for us’. It is hardly remarkable, then, that fertility clinics 
capitalize (on) a hope as ostensibly innocent as a child’s, but selectively 
destined for and marketed globally to a clientele who can afford fertility 
services. Each ‘postcard’ bears distinct addresses and addressees. In 
Cornelia Vismann and Markus Krajewski’s terms, they are ‘transfer 
media’, which are legal in their own right: ‘Law relies on transfer 
media and yet is itself a transfer system; it transfers rights’ (2007: 91). 
However, I understand these media not simply as transferential nodes 
in an economy of (legal) rights. Rather, they wield the rhetorical and 
transitive power to produce subjects of rights, subjectivity, or legal 
standing ‘before the law’, to invoke Kafka once again. Polyvocal and 
itinerant across our media ecologies, these ‘postcards’—much like the 
services they advertise—are agentic technologies, shaping postures, 
attitudes, expectations, desires, and perceptions. They are relational yet 
not necessarily causally related; it is difficult to trace their interstitial 
effects, repercussions, and pedagogies. They are not simply unrelated 
snapshots lacking frame or context. They constitute, rather, a fictional 
exchange within a wider marketplace of speech/acts that perform—in 
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and as correspondence—a certain hope and, often, a nostalgia that hails 
us, offering discrete yet syncretizing sites of affective identification.
In my small selection of ‘postcards’, just as with Derrida’s and 
Kundera’s, it is as if the effect ontologically precedes the cause. In 
other words, that which is artefactual and counterfactual appears as a 
priori materiality or fact. Much as Plato’s writings generate Socrates, 
or Ludvik’s postcard predestines him as the political enemy he will 
become, for each fertility industry ‘postcard’ there is a corresponding 
addressee who is already conscripted, mobilized, and haunted in and 
by that address—even as this mobilization and generation are eclipsed, 
obscuring their agentic and generative traces. For the claim here is not 
simply about biological reproduction, but rather about the reproduction 
of reproduction itself, and how this matter is transmitted, instilled, and 
symbolized as ‘hope’, or, in the fullness of time, as future-matters of 
legal custody, genealogy, inheritance, filiation, objecthood. As Derrida 
writes (once again a postcard), ‘A child is what one should not be able 
to “send” oneself. It never will be, never should be a sign, a letter, even 
a symbol’ (1987: 25). Every loving parent locked in a custody battle for 
their child knows the pain of legal objecthood. And yet the fertility 
industry materializes precisely here, in this space.
Under neoliberal biopolitics, as under communism, we might 
say, optimism or hope is what matters, making of life a public-
private partnership. Both political regimes seem to converge on this 
revolutionary promise, on its utopian futures, and though their means 
of arriving there diverge markedly, this is serious business: ‘no great 
movement designed to change the world can bear sarcasm or mockery’ 
(242), we read from one of Kundera’s characters. In our contemporary 
context, the fertility industry provides a key case study in the solemn yet 
speculative futures of making matter, making life, and making living 
matter (see Figure 5). The abdication of optimism or hope is anathema: 
hope is a biopolitical diktat, a happy future inscribed into the techno-
scientific and marketized ruses of progress, a marketing slogan repeated 
across fertility blogs, by clinics, right down to hope-inspired apparel 
and accessories produced for fertility-industry mothers and babies. In 
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recent years, hope itself has also been materialized, biomedicalized, its 
absence pathologized: consider the burgeoning psychological ‘science 
of hope’, with ostensibly evidence-based interventions that include 
empiricist ‘hope scales’ and ‘hope therapy’ (e.g., see Gallagher and 
Lopez 2017). Temporally, it represents what Jack Halberstam (2005) 
calls ‘ReproTime’, a temporization that figures as both natural and 
desirable: the ‘normative scheduling of daily life (early to bed, early to 
rise) that accompanies the practice of child rearing’ (5). 
Figure 5: Screenshot from www.fertilefuture.ca
From within the temporal inscriptions of futurity, of promise—from 
within this counterfactual future—we are not meant to dwell on the 
opportunity costs, the collateral damages, or negative externalities of 
‘making live’, as if doing so could only signal the monstrous repudiation 
of life itself. And yet, these injunctions notwithstanding, sometimes 
hope does not materialize, and desire does not yield fecundation. Despite 
the egg-freezing cocktail parties, flexible finance plans, aggressive 
marketing, blogs and social networks, current success rates are based 
on probability modelling and there are little concrete data; indeed, 
there are little data on any long-term health consequences for mothers 
and none for their offspring. ‘Hope’ seems to stand in for the absence 
of facts, or stands in as fact. 
The serial fertility ‘postcards’, themselves fertile sites and rites of 
passage, are material instantiations, salvos—as material as the clinics 
and fertility treatments themselves—working in and on and around 
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bodies conscripted to emit a hope that is always and only impossibly 
immaterial, even when that hope bears fruit. For what is hoped-for, 
what comes to life and comes to matter, if it does, is not hope itself, 
despite the industry’s metonymic slippage between hope and the child, 
means and end, cause and effect (see Figure 6).
Figure 6: Screenshot from www.newhopefertility.com 
If the child were hope’s material object and objective, then hope 
too would be (its) matter. The fruits of these labours are sometimes 
referred to as ‘hope babies’ (or ‘rainbow babies’ if the birth happens 
after a miscarriage, stillborn, or neonatal death). In this metonymy, 
infancy and childhood are fetishized as innocent and pure, a matter 
of cultural projection and cathexis. As Lee Edelman (2004) remarks, 
the child represents ‘variously sentimentalized cultural identifications, 
has come to embody for us the telos of the social order and come to 
be seen as the one for whom that order is held in perpetual trust’ (11). 
We might well be, understandably, nostalgic for the postcard’s 
delivery, even before it arrives, inducted into the loss of what will (not) 
have been, with the promises of techno-science available, for a price, to 
secure this future today. Here is figured the reproductive body (mater, 
or ‘mother’) as matter and matter-ing, both biologically and through 
the cultural performatives of optimism or hope. If we believe industry 
messaging, we are expected to concede the perverse materialism of the 
reproductive body, ‘priceless’ yet rendered as human (venture) capital 
to be realized, in sense and in seed. This suggests, as Michael Warner 
(1991) phrases it, ‘a relation to self that finds its proper temporality and 
fulfillment in generational transmission’ (9). But who or what, after all, 
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is the destinataire—the addressee—of hope’s address? What destiny 
or density lies in futures ‘held in perpetual trust’? Fertility industry 
‘postcards’ are as much material as materiel—the aggregate of objects 
required to run a business (distinguished from its personnel or human 
face), but also munitions for battle in the culture wars. Together, the 
‘postcards’ constitute a repertoire of images that shore up and imprint, 
or materialize, the (dollar) value of ‘life’. 
Foucault (2008) employs a telling example in his assessment of 
American neoliberalism and ‘human capital’. It is worth citing at length:
the neo-liberals tried to explain, for example, how the mother-child 
relationship, concretely characterized by the time spent by the mother 
with the child, the quality of the care she gives, the affection she shows, 
the vigilance with which she follows its development, its education, and 
not only its scholastic but also its physical progress, the way in which 
she not only gives it food but also imparts a particular style to eating 
patterns, and the relationship she has with its eating, all constitute 
for the neo-liberals an investment which can be measured in time. 
And what will this investment constitute? It will constitute a human 
capital, the child’s human capital, which will produce an income. 
What will this income be? It will be the child’s salary when he or she 
becomes an adult. And what will the income be for the mother who 
made the investment? Well, the neo-liberals say, it will be a psychical 
income. (243–44)
The matter and measure of time and of (future) capital become 
increasingly speculative, increasingly vigilant and anxious, within the 
temporalities of the fertility industry. The would-be parent’s ‘psychical 
income’ demands an investment in hope but also often a capital 
investment in the fertility industry. But rather than ‘income’ in the strict 
sense, now or for tomorrow, ‘hope’ here is mattered and measured in 
economies of psychical and material debt, and sometimes failure. They 
are fictional economies, (re)produced and propped up by an industry that 
hopes most to profit, to reap a return-on-investment. Hope, too, much 
like the stock market, has become deregulated, virtual, outside of legal 
jurisdiction. Much of the fertility industry operates in a legal grey zone 
without even the instruments of ‘soft law’ (guidelines, accreditation, 
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regulated data collection, reporting). But this also suggests law’s failure 
to imagine—and to regulate—the profoundly speculative futures of 
neoliberalism, the temporality of generation, whether this represents 
the transpersonal generation of future wealth, a future child, or, stated 
more obliquely, a future held in perpetual trust, venture ‘capital’ hostage 
to ‘hopeful’ biotechnologies.2 For an increasing number of U.S. states, it 
is no contradiction whatsoever that the law should intervene to regulate 
and restrict women’s reproductive freedoms (e.g., through ‘personhood’ 
initiatives), including the availability of pregnancy termination: here, 
too, a certain ‘life’ is understood, cultivated and exalted, according to 
differential political and ideological calculi—all of which suggests that 
law’s silence on the fertility industry has little to do with law’s interest 
in securing someone’s ‘freedom to choose’, and more to do with how 
law has been conscripted by a certain techno-political understanding 
of ‘life itself ’. 
4 On matter and method
New materialist scholars typically situate themselves somewhere in 
relation to ‘matter’ and ‘discourse’, sometimes negotiating the terms 
of their correspondence, or charting a path between empiricism and 
relativism, realism and idealism. But my ‘object’ (if that is what it is) does 
not quite yield to the micropolitics of such binarity—nor to the ‘binary 
mode’ of either algorithm or law—‘the mode of decision-making’ 
(Vismann and Krajewski 2007: 91), which materializes in its own way 
and obscures the temporizing persuasions of circularity and circuitry, 
whose densities, we might say, verge on the immaterial. If this paper 
wades into the emissions of sense or of seed, then, it is not to pick a side 
or to propose yet another way that matter is discourse, or vice versa, but 
to think through some of the presuppositions that these terms tend to 
secrete and reproduce. I agree with Kang and Kendall’s ‘legal materialist 
approach’ inasmuch as it ‘takes care not to collapse into either a 
materialist determinism or a hermeneutic self-referentiality’; however, 
I am less certain how ‘a legal materialist mode of inquiry mediates 
between these two poles…’ (Kang and Kendall, Introduction: 5). 
Mediation is at stake, certainly, and yet I’m not certain that these two 
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poles occupy opposite ends of a single continuum; and if there are 
ruptures or discontinuities between them, these frustrate attempts to 
negotiate a mediation. 
My thesis, then, is mindful of ruptures and discontinuities, which 
I have tried to stage here through the readings of my ‘sites’ as well 
as in their juxtaposition(s). In this respect, (legal) new materialism 
falters in at least two, related, ways: temporally and rhetorically. First, 
temporally, with respect to hoped-for futures cast in the speculative 
temporality of techno-science: this is a future that often does not 
materialize, and while it relies on material practises in the present (e.g., 
capital investments in hormone treatments, the freezing of embryos or 
blastocysts), these practises are not ‘materializations’ of future hopes or 
even psychical ‘investments’. It is only by a reifying sleight of hand, by 
conjuring, that we speak of the (materialist) ‘agencies’ of future-matters 
that do not yet or may never exist. The future always holds its own 
secrets, and future-matters always belong to the future, in its rupturable 
and discontinuous coming-into-being. If, then, as Kang (2018) states, 
‘Legal matters need to be situated’ (456), what might it mean to ‘situate’ 
matters temporally rather than spatially? And if we did, how would 
we begin with our ‘ontological qualifications’ (462) of them? And it is 
here, I suspect, that we glimpse law’s bias: its sovereign jurisdictions 
rely on precedential appeals to the past, whereas neoliberal biopolitics 
and techno-science project onto future-oriented counterfactuals, in 
a fictional time to-come rather than in a ‘concrete’ place. As Derrida 
says, we are obliged ‘de laisser de l ’avenir à l ’avenir’—‘to let the future 
have a future’ (Derrida and Stiegler 2002: 85), or, to leave some of the 
future to what is still to come.3
Second, rhetorically, (legal) new materialism as a methodological 
or analytic apparatus does not quite appreciate the immaterial force of 
language and rhetorical tropes, and in particular, fictional language. 
And this is so, ironically, even as it relies on language, tropology, and 
fiction. What, after all, is the ‘materiality’ of the allegory, the metaphor, 
or the metonym, which ruptures reference, and is discontinuous 
with propositional logic? The ‘ joke’, too, as Kundera so artfully 
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demonstrates, cuts in more than one way. Rhetorical ambivalence and 
equivocation are essential and cannot be outstripped; I would wish to 
amplify their significance in ways that disorient ‘new materialisms’ 
and ‘object-oriented ontologies’. As Kang (2018) rightly points out, 
‘it is extremely difficult to make the forces which hold and move 
matters “appear,” let alone to interpret them’ (454). Perhaps this is why 
new materialists tend to privilege examples derived from molecular 
biology, physics, and chemistry, but rarely from rhetoric. And yet 
the force of law relies on performative speech acts, which, according 
to J. L. Austin (1962), are illocutions that say what they do and do 
what they say. And to complicate matters, there are rhetorical tropes, 
which sometimes do more or otherwise than they say and say more or 
otherwise than (what) they do. ‘Appearances’ are deceiving. Even our 
everyday words sometimes lack any material referents, as they must. 
After all, there is no matter for ‘love’ or for what ‘matters’, for, love is 
not some prior possession I have to give; nor does its giving—for I am 
given in that giving—secure any return to sender: speech/act, acting-
out, actualization, it’s immaterial. (This shares in the ‘old’ materialist 
critique of private property). What matters is, rather, called forth. 
And thankfully, the ambivalence of the call, its precariousness, also 
cannot be outstripped. As Derrida puts it in one of his ‘postcards’—his 
envois—‘and when I call you my love, my love, is it you I am calling 
or my love?’ (1987: 8).
Writing through fiction, my approach in this essay invokes the 
ambivalence of the fugue, derived from fugere and fugare (‘to flee’ 
and ‘to pursue’). It is meant to suggest a polyphonic composition that 
echoes across our media ecologies and appears again in the form of 
Kundera’s novel itself, both in Ludvik’s ‘fugue states’ (psychologically) 
and in the importance of folk music for him, its call-and-response, its 
weightless densities and histories, its power ‘to create through the music 
a protective enclosure in the midst of the rowdy drunks, like a glass 
cabin suspended in the cold depths of the sea’ (315). This sentence, its 
simile, its imagery, and its sense are nonsense without figurative flights 
of language. As I elaborate below, the ‘subject’ and ‘speech’ are for me 
purposefully ambivalent as I navigate the spaces—the void—between 
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my two ‘sites’ and their juxtaposition(s). As Foucault (1998) writes: 
‘The “subject” of literature (what speaks in it and what it speaks about) 
is less language in its positivity than the void that language takes as 
its space when it articulates itself in the nakedness of “I speak”’ (149). 
And so my two ‘sites’—one factual, one f ictional—at least 
ostensibly—are less ‘case studies’ in their own right than they are 
in their juxtaposition(s), in the void, the space-between—a space 
to think—the ethical collisions between the fertility industry and 
Kundera’s political-literary fiction, The Joke. The void ‘object’, then, 
comes at us obliquely, in the ruptures and discontinuities of ‘postcards’, 
as ‘hopes’, ‘ jokes’, and in the hypostatizations of identity in and across 
these incommensurable milieus or jurisdictions, neither quite factual 
nor fictional, neither public nor private. I would insist on this void—
call it a generative difference, if you will—and see here the limits of a 
materialist disposition, the space or place where materialism falters both 
temporally and rhetorically. Indeed, the equivocation of my ‘sites’—and 
indeed, their rhythmic temporizations and tropic indiscretions—are 
not quite ‘concrete’ problems/matters or materials that yield to a 
(legal) new materialist approach. If these spaces appear as ‘concrete’ 
or ‘material’—if their distance is collapsed rather than held open, as a 
wound—this is because we have been seduced by the ruses of techno-
science, their promise that ‘the future is now’, and that these futures 
are at our material disposal in the present. Law’s materiality, as Kang 
(2018) argues, is predicated on ‘multiple representational practices, such 
as texts, spatial orderings and ritualised performances’ (456). But the 
future remains—the Open—and cannot be ‘materialized’ in the present 
as anything but a speculative representation, or projection. Even risk 
is not concrete, it defies representation, however much we ‘manage’ it 
and hope to control it through statistical probabilities, modelling, etc. 
Nor is language the raw material—or tool—of representation, for this 
would strip language of its intrinsic powers of rupture and discontinuity, 
which are endless. I take seriously Kang’s (2018) claim that ‘Law’s 
matters are not always material, and the latter word is meant in the sense 
of mattering’ (457). I would like to see this affirmation developed in 
legal materialist scholarship because it sits so uncomfortably alongside 
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‘new materialist demands for being more attuned to the ways matters 
are, act or speak for themselves…’ (457). Even if matter is ‘vibrant’ 
(Bennett 2009)—a quasi-theological claim—I do not understand 
matter as ever speaking ‘for itself ’, it is not the Word, and this marks 
another of my (rhetorical) breaks with new materialist ontologies and 
so-called ‘postcritique’. Language matters, but matter has no—and is 
not—language. And so language is only a ‘materiality’ in a fictional 
sense, or as a legal fiction—and these matter, certainly, and sometimes 
unto death, but there is no legal account here, no possible account, of 
law’s own language, whether material or metaphorical, or of the void 
that language takes as its space when law would (and it would that it 
could) articulate itself—a neuter it-self—in the nakedness of ‘I speak’.
5 In refrain
By way of refrain, rather than conclusion, I invoke juxtaposing 
scenes—or ‘jurisdictions’—from Kundera’s novel: two faces of ‘hope’, 
or two openings perhaps, whose tempos and dictions attest to matters 
incommensurable. These two aspects are also in tension across the 
discursive ‘materialities’ of hope tendered by the fertility industry, 
which, much like legal fictions, must be read as speech/acts. In this 
reading, hope is a fiction, which is not to say that it is does not matter 
but only that it is not matter. By ‘fiction’—and by extension ‘law’—I 
absolutely do not mean speech/acts that interiorize or ‘materialize’ a 
sovereign subjectivity in the liberal tradition which harkens back to 
‘a time when the interiorization of the law of history and the world 
was being imperiously demanded by Western consciousness as never 
before’ (Foucault 1998: 150). And this is so even as we are enjoined 
today to embrace the imperious materiality of subjective identity—
and identity politics—that convenes and seem to materialize in these 
fictional places. Rather, in gesturing to our postcards’ correspondence, 
and in their temporalities of generation, by ‘fiction’ I intend an opening, 
a rhetorical agency, or a
void in which the contentless slimness of ‘I speak’ is manifested … [as] 
an absolute opening through which language endlessly spreads forth, 
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[and in] which the subject—the ‘I’ who speaks—fragments, disperses, 
scatters, disappearing in that naked space. (Foucault 1998: 148)
This nakedness, I contend, is fiction’s hope, its opening and exteriority, 
which is not quite the dialectical negation of materiality—for this would 
serve only to bring ‘what one negates into the troubled interiority of 
the mind’ (Foucault 1998: 152). Here, the two ways that legal new 
materialism falters—temporally and rhetorically—come into relation, 
without quite (I hope) ceding on hope. 
It is fifteen years since Ludvik was excommunicated from the Party 
and imprisoned in a labour camp. He is now a free man, but all he 
hopes for is to take revenge on those who condemned him so long ago, 
especially his former friend and fellow student, Pavel Zemanek, whose 
eloquent and spiteful testimony had sealed Ludvik’s fate during his 
public ‘trial’. Ludvik’s plan is revenge by proxy: to ravage and possess 
something dear to Pavel—a tryst with his wife, Helena. ‘I had dreamed 
this plan up with the power of fifteen years of rancor’ (178), he says, 
in the troubled interiority of his mind. The plan is set in motion, but 
as he awaits the arrival of Helena’s bus, this scene is interrupted by 
the appearance of many baby carriages in front of the town’s National 
Committee Building. Ludvik is curious, he has time to kill, so—why 
not?—he enters.
What he witnesses in details painstakingly portrayed by Kundera is 
a highly ritualized—though secular, Communist—mass ‘christening’ 
or birthrite, officially called ‘a welcoming of new citizens to life’. 
On stage, children begin to sing: solitary voices at first, with similar 
refrains that syncretize in chorus and draw an equation between babies 
and ‘springtime’, ‘roses’, ‘flowers’. ‘All of a sudden one of the boys … 
said spring had come and all papas and mamas were rejoicing and the 
whole earth was rejoicing’ (170). Another boy ‘proclaimed that children 
were peace’ (171). Then a man from the National Committee stands, 
in regal garb, and presides over the ceremony—the official in charge 
of citizen affairs. 
He too spoke of spring, of flowers, of mamas and papas, he also spoke 
of love, which according to him bore fruit, but suddenly his vocabulary 
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was transformed and the words duty, responsibility, the State, and 
citizen appeared; suddenly there was no more papa and mama, but 
father and mother, and he was enumerating all the blessings the State 
offered them (the fathers and mothers) and reminding them that it was 
their duty in return to bring up their children to be model citizens. (171)
Hope here is forcibly materialized in the future responsibilities of 
citizenship, the parents’ signatures inscribed as promissory into the 
State’s secular book of life (literally hypo-statized), and the young 
bodies of these new citizens fetishized as (always-already) material 
organs of the proletariat, of the body biopolitic. Obedient to an ‘old’ 
materialist logic, private property is abolished, subsumed by the State, 
made public. Ludvik learns that participation in this ritual was not 
compulsory, not officially at least, but ‘the National Committee used 
attendance as a touchstone for evaluating people’s sense of citizenship 
and their attitude towards the State, and in the end people realized 
that and came’ (173). 
The coercion of this scene linking matters of sex, future life, and 
the ‘concretizations’ of citizenship sits uncomfortably alongside the 
subsequent scene of coercion that unfolds in Ludvik’s sexual liaison 
with Helena. ‘I was wary of the slightest risk,’ he narrates, ‘afraid to 
bungle an opportunity that meant so much to me, not because Helena 
was particularly young, particularly nice, or particularly attractive, but 
purely and simply because her name was Zemanek and her husband 
was a man I hated’ (175). This scene is without its own future, as 
Ludvik imagines it, despite what he promises Helena by way of 
seduction. The sexual act is invited, not quite forced, but nonetheless 
brusque and violent, a ‘beautiful act of demolition’ (196), he says. In 
the afterglow, Helena nevertheless professes her undying love and 
devotion to Ludvik, and imagines their future together, while he is at 
pains to extricate himself. His plan fails, however, not only because his 
extrication becomes complicated by Helena’s attempted (but botched) 
suicide (she tries to overdose on what turns out to be laxatives), but 
because Helena and Pavel had in any case been estranged for several 
years, Pavel seeking a divorce and Helena seeking new love. Later, 
with some remorse, Ludvik confesses, ‘I had acted vilely, having turned 
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her into a mere object, into a stone I had tried (and failed) to throw at 
someone else’ (283). 
The joke, of course, sometimes enjoys its own fecundity in time, 
and like matter (and matters that matter), reproduces and cuts in 
more than one direction: ‘that bad joke which, not content with itself, 
had gone on monstrously multiplying itself into more and more silly 
jokes’ (288). The joke, the fiction, is a generative transmission because 
it does not speak in the interiorizing language of self-reflexivity: ‘It 
must be directed’, Foucault writes of literature, ‘not toward any inner 
confirmation—not toward a kind of central, unshakable certitude—but 
toward an outer bound where it must continually content itself ’ (1998: 
152). It does not make of identity a materiality; quite the contrary. 
‘What if history plays jokes?’ Ludvik asks himself, to which he answers: 
‘And then I realized how powerless I was to revoke my own joke when 
throughout my life as a whole I was involved in a joke much more vast 
(all-embracing for me) and utterly irrevocable’ (288–289). The state’s 
‘welcoming’ ritual of citizenship is one such joke, hoping to materialize 
that which matters otherwise. Conversely, the ceremonial of Helena’s 
‘demolition’—on a body reduced to brute matter, a ‘stone’—mocks sex, 
citizenship, and any instantiation of hope or of future. It is not enough, 
then, to sovereignly oppose one or the other ‘materialization’, but to 
analyse the non-sovereign legal, textual, and cultural fictions at play. 
In the interstices, as Foucault was fond of saying, between legal fictions 
and legal ‘materialities’, we might begin to read and to problematize 
the correspondence between the technologies of law, politics, and 
life. In the moment between nostalgia’s past and our techno-scientific 
futures, then, and in vocal defiance of both sovereign and biopolitical 
diktats, a critical presentism and presentist critique finds its rupture, 
its discontinuity: ‘I felt a tiny crack opening up between the person 
I had been and the person I should be (according to the spirit of the 
times) and tried to be’ (32).
These juxtaposed scenes, finally, represent two ‘laws’ of kinship, 
both of which are legal fictions, whether expressly so, as in Kundera, or 
more allegorically (but no less really), as we see in the many faces—in 
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the hopes and the harms—of the fertility industry. Foucault (1998) 
might be said to summarize these two dimensions of law:
If it were self-evident and in the heart, the law would no longer be the 
law, but the sweet interiority of consciousness. If, on the other hand, 
it were present in a text, if it were possible to decipher it between the 
lines of a book, if it were in a register that could be consulted, then 
it would have the solidity of external things: it would be possible to 
follow or disobey it. Where then would its power reside, by what force 
or prestige would it command respect? (157)
The first is not law, Foucault says, and yet without the first the second 
is senseless. To obey or disobey, to respect or disrespect, are also matters 
of the heart, of one’s conscience—that without which matter does not 
and cannot matter. In Kundera’s scenes, the intimate ritual of Helena’s 
‘demolition’ is for her a matter of the heart, whereas for Ludvik it is a 
‘vile’ material act. Nevertheless, for each the act is a matter of hopes that 
are held and that promise to hold open futures calibrated according to 
the kinship of love (for Helena) or of hate (for Ludvik), even if these 
particular futures are fated never to materialize. Hope’s futures have 
their dark and atavistic dimensions, also (but not just) matters of the 
heart, and in and by which ‘hope’ is tendered, there, where subjects and 
subject matters are at times violently fragmented, dispersed, scattered, 
and disappear in the shadows. In the correspondence between Kundera’s 
two scenes (which fiction invites but does not force), matters of ‘the 
heart’ do not underwrite or secure the legal materiality of ‘external 
things’; rather, the correspondence only underscores law’s fictionality, 
its joke. The ritual of ‘welcoming new citizens to life’ is a political 
charade and does not, for all its ceremoniousness, command respect or 
obedience; an instability guardedly masked as a fictive stability, it also 
cannot bridge the axes of political identity or communal life. Law, as 
fiction, folds back upon itself, fugally—both fleeing and pursuing: ‘The 
law is the shadow toward which every gesture necessarily advances; 
it is itself the shadow of the advancing gesture’ (Foucault 1998: 158). 
Kundera’s ‘old’ materialist scene of state-sanctioned fertility shadows, 
today, in parody perhaps, the ritualized market-driven economies of 
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the fertility industry, which supplant Communist onto-logics with 
Neoliberal and ‘new’ materialist ones—a joke that history is playing on 
us. Together, their ceremonials signal, and hope to secure, a future that 
their performances nevertheless belie as both anxious and uncertain, 
even paranoid, their solemn disavowals notwithstanding. And it is 
perhaps this latter correspondence, itself something of a joke, an ironic 
transmission, that calls forth in my reading some furtive hope. 
Endnotes
1. Subsequent references to Kundera’s novel will cite page numbers only.
2. Legal scholars seeking a ‘bloodier’ case study—with its numerous legal 
battles—need look no further than the Theranos debacle. As the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission attests, Theranos investors were 
defrauded out of vast sums of money for nearly a decade (see www.sec.
gov/news/press-release/2018-41). Everything I claim concerning the 
speculative futures of neoliberalism and biotech applies to this case as well. 
I thank Michael Dorland for bringing this to my attention.
3. I thank Tad Lemieux for bringing this text to my attention and for helping 
me to think more critically about temporality, rhythmicity, and not least, 
‘the joke’ (see Murray and Lemieux 2019).
References
Austin J L 1962 How To Do Things With Words Oxford University Press Oxford
Bennett J 2009 Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things Duke University 
Press Durham
Berlant L 1999 ‘The Subject of True Feeling: Pain, Privacy, and Politics’ in 
Sarat et al 1999: 49–84
Cadava E, Connor P and Nancy J-L eds 1991 Who Comes After the Subject? 
Routledge New York
Derrida J 1987 The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond University of 
Chicago Press Chicago
-- 1991 ‘“Eating Well,” or the Calculation of the Subject: An Interview with 
Jacques Derrida’ in Cadava et al 1991: 96–119
222
Stuart J. Murray
-- and Stiegler B 2002 Echographies of Television: Filmed Interviews Bajorek J 
trans Polity Press Cambridge
Edelman L 2004 No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive Duke University 
Press Durham
Faubion J D ed 1998 Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology The New Press 
New York
Foucault M 1998 ‘The Thought of the Outside’ in Faubion 1998: 147–69
-- 2003 “Society Must Be Defended”: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–1976 
Picador New York
-- 2008 The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978–1979 
Picador New York
Gallagher M W and Lopez S J eds 2017 The Oxford Handbook of Hope Oxford 
University Press Oxford
Halberstam J 2005 In a Queer Time and Place: Transgender Bodies, Subcultural 
Lives New York University Press New York
Hartouni V 1997 Cultural Conceptions: On Reproductive Technologies and the 
Remaking of Life University of Minnesota Press Minneapolis
Hayles N K 2005 My Mother Was a Computer: Digital Subjects and Literary 
Texts University of Chicago Press Chicago
Kang H Y 2018 ‘Law’s materiality’ in Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos ed. 
2018: 453-74
Kang H Y and Kendall S 2019 ‘Legal Materiality’ in Stern S et al eds 2019 
Kundera M 1982 The Joke Harper Collins New York
Murray S J and Lemieux T 2019 ‘Combat—Débat: Parataxis and the 
Unavowable Community; or, The Joke’ Philosophy & Rhetoric 52: 78–85
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos A ed 2018 Routledge Handbook of Law and 
Theory Routledge Abingdon
Sarat A and Kearns T R eds 1999 Cultural Pluralism, Identity Politics, and the 
Law University of Michigan Press Ann Arbor
Stern S et al eds 2019 Oxford Handbook for Law and the Humanities Oxford 
University Press Oxford 
Vismann C and Krajewski M 2007 ‘Computer Juridisms’ Grey Room 29: 
90–109
Warner M 1991 ‘Introduction: Fear of a Queer Planet’ Social Text 29: 3–17
